

Excerpt from MFR by Kirkpatrick on PFIAB mtg of Friday, 7 Dec 62.

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25X1 30. [] asked if the judgment on the degree of readiness of the SAM sites was a coordinated opinion. The DCI said that after the 9 Oct meeting a decision was reached to transfer the operation from CIA to SAC. It was considered a hazardous mission if the SAM's were active; it was also considered that []

25X1 The NRO had considered the [] and Charyk had recommended to Gilpatric that SAC take over the operation. CIA protested, and the DCI was telephoned on the West Coast but he believed the decision to transfer the operation was taken by the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Killian asked whether it had come up in the SG or had gone to the Pres. The DCI replied that the opn had been mentioned to the Pres by himself and Gilpatric on the 9th, but that he did not think the decision to transfer had ever gone to the President. He asked Mr. Kirkpatrick if this was correct and the latter replied that it was his impression that the final decision had been reached in a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office. The DCI noted that the decision had not made much difference in the results. Gen. Carroll said he wanted to make sure that everybody understood that SAC had flown where they intended to fly. [] commented that the activation of the SA-2 depended on the route of the aircraft.

25X1 31. Dr. Killian asked if all of the U-2 flts were considered by the SG. The DCI said that at the first of each month the SG considered all flts. He noted that there were about 500 peripheral flts plus 2 U-2's over Cuba each month. In Sept he said there was grave concern that aflt might be knocked down. There was some timidity because of two U-2 incidents and an attitude of caution was prevalent at the 4 and 9 October meetings. The DCI then read the chronology of the U-2 flts. (Coyne asked for a copy).

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NRO review(s) completed.